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Abstract 
 
Spain is a world leader in solar energy production and until 2009 operated a feed-in tariff policy 
that provided solar energy producers with a preferential price for the electricity they fed back 
into the grid. This policy was scaled back in 2009 when Spain found itself facing severe 
economic downturn. It has now been repealed entirely. While domestic investors in solar energy 
had to absorb the resulting loss in profits, foreign investors sought compensation under the 
Energy Charter Treaty. They alleged that Spain had breached its obligations as a signatory state 
and commenced arbitral proceedings accordingly.   
 
These arbitral proceedings signal the first time that the Energy Charter Treaty has been used to 
resolve a dispute over renewable energy investment as well as the first time that the treaty has 
been used by multiple investors to claim against a host state.  The novelty of this situation has 
tested the efficiency of the established rules and procedures of investment treaty arbitration and 
has put a spotlight on the issues that arise when multiple investor claims are arbitrated separately. 
This paper examines the precise nature of those issues, reflects on the evolution of arbitration 
into the investor-state arena and proposes a number of ways in which the system might be better 
streamlined to handle multiple-investor claims. 
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The text of this paper (excluding contents page, abstract, non-substantive footnote and reference 
list) is 14,940 words 
Introduction 
 
When Spain drastically reduced the scale and scope of its economic price support policy (or 
feed-in tariff scheme) for solar energy producers, it found itself facing numerous legal challenges 
from foreign investors. These investors alleged that Spain’s actions were in breach of the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT).1 Like many trade treaties, the ECT includes an investment chapter, which 
provides foreign investors with a number of protections that are enforceable against a host State.2 
Investors in solar photovoltaic energy (solar PV) took advantage of these protections and 
commenced arbitration against Spain, seeking full compensation for the loss of their past and 
future feed-in tariffs. Yet, while their claims stemmed from the same regulatory changes and 
were based upon comparable legal arguments, they were not consolidated into one legal 
challenge.  
 
Instead, individual investors or groups of similar investors were left to initiate independent 
proceedings of their own accord. In keeping with the fundamental principles of arbitration, they 
were free to choose the rules governing the dispute, select their own arbitrators and determine 
the level of confidentiality to which the proceedings would adhere. 3 They initiated proceedings 
on such terms and by July 2015 twenty separate solar PV claims were lodged against Spain. With 
the exception of one group of 15 investors, who jointly commenced proceedings against Spain 
(the PV Investors v Spain), each and every solar investor requested that their claim be heard 
separately, before a separate tribunal, composed of an entirely unique set of arbitrators. 4 This 
differentiation was favoured by Spain too on the basis that it would have “multiple shots” at 
avoiding liability; but it was not conducive to good law-making. It fragmented this dispute into 
protracted multiple proceedings, which involved twenty arbitral tribunals and three sets of 
  
1  Energy Charter Treaty 2080 UNTS 95 (opened for signature 17 December 1994, entered  
into force 16 April 1998) [ECT], part III. 
2  Art 26. 
3  Christopher Dugan and others Investor-State Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2008) at 212 and 219. 
4  The first fifteen claimants did consolidate their claims into one joint proceeding under the  
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, but no other investors have followed suit.  See The PV Investors v Spain 
(Decision on Bifurcation), UNCITRAL, 1 March 2013. 
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arbitral rules. Such fragmentation is not desirable and poses a significant risk to the legitimacy 
of investment-arbitration.5 When multiple related arbitrations are conducted separately and in 
confidence, without deference to the awards rendered in other tribunals, the risk of inconsistent 
decisions is considerable.6 Inconsistent decisions trouble stakeholders and threaten their ability 
to rely on past arbitral awards as a form of soft precedent or jurisprudence constante.7 In the 
case of the Spanish solar arbitrations, inconsistent decisions risk exacerbating the crisis that has 
plagued Spain since 2008 and further undermine any potential to clarify states’ liability to 
renewable energy investors under the ECT.8  
 
This inconsistency is the central focus of the following paper. It posits that Investment 
arbitration, as a method of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), struggles to effectively 
resolve treaty disputes between multiple investors and host states, such as the Spanish solar 
crisis. The resolution of these multi-party disputes requires stability and predictability, neither 
of which has been prioritised in the evolution of investment treaty arbitration.9 Instead, accuracy 
and party autonomy reign supreme. While this is appropriate in two-party disputes between an 
investor and a host state, such priorities are at least doubtful in multi-party proceedings, not least 
because they undermine the rule of law.10 
 
This paper will argue that the evolution of investment arbitration, through the individualisation 
of investor claims, has created a system of ISDS that fails to effectively consider multiple 
investor claims in a way that is consistent and which promotes stability. It will use the Spanish 
solar crisis as a model to demonstrate that when multiple investor claims are adjudicated 
concurrently, the risk of inconsistency and regulatory uncertainty grows. It will then examine 
  
5  For an example of such inconsistency elsewhere, it is worthwhile to examine the ten arbitral decisions  
rendered in the wake of Argentina’s financial crisis of 2001. A detailed explanation of the outcome can be 
found in José Alvarez The Public International Law Regime Governing International Investment (The 
Hague, Hague Academy of International Law, 2011) at 76. 
6  At 86. 
7  Jeffery P Commission “Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Citation Analysis of  
Developing Jurisprudence” (2007) 24(2) Journal of International Arbitration 130-158 at 135-136.   
8  Christopher Coats “Can it Get Worse for Spain’s Solar Policy? It Just Did” (30 June 2015) Forbes  
Business www.forbes.com. 
9  Alvarez, above n 5, at 86 and 90. 
10  Gus Van Harten Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (1st ed, Oxford University Press, 2007) at  
97. 
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the practical impacts of such an approach and assess how ISDS might be streamlined to better 
address multiple investor claims. This paper proposes a number of amendments to the rules 
governing investment treaty arbitration and will focus in particular on those relevant to ECT 
disputes.  It contends that the status quo is ineffective and argues that considerable reform is 
needed to address the growing number of disputes arising out of regulatory reforms affecting 
whole industries or business sectors.   
 
Part I of this paper will argue that the history of investment arbitration has failed to give due 
consideration to rule of law concerns that arise in any investor-state dispute. Part II will provide 
a background to the Spanish solar arbitrations and examine how the largest ever ECT arbitration 
came to be. Part III will demonstrate the importance of the Spanish solar crisis as a model for 
assessing the effectiveness of investment treaty arbitration and will function as the crux of this 
paper. It will demonstrate the rough and ready style of arbitration that occurs when multiple-
investor disputes are arbitrated under the ECT. Finally, Part IV will outline how ISDS might be 
streamlined to better ensure consistency between decisions, particularly in the context of ECT 
disputes.  
 
I The Evolution of Investment Treaty Arbitration 
 
The evolution of ISDS has been shaped by a complex web of international investment treaties 
into a specific and yet decentralised process known as investment treaty arbitration. This section 
of the paper will examine how investment treaty arbitration came to be, what it provides for 
investors and states, its shortcomings and why it struggles to address the public law issues that 
underlie large-scale public regulation disputes. 
A The Development of the International Investment Treaty 
In international law, there is no governing document of investment treaty arbitration. Instead, a 
web of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) impose a set of substantive obligations on signatory 
states, which require them to provide foreign investors with certain legal protections.11 These 
  
11  See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) The Entry Into Force of  
Bilateral Investment Treaties (UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements Monitor No 3, 2006/9, 
2006). 
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protections are enforceable among any of the states that sign such treaties, owing to one 
multilateral investment treaty in particular, the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (“ICSID Convention”).12 If a foreign 
investor believes such standards of protection have not been upheld, it can bring a claim before 
an international arbitral tribunal that will issue a binding award. Such tribunals are seen to 
provide a fair resolution of the dispute, while maintaining a premium on cost-effectiveness and 
efficiency.13  
 The emergence of foreign direct investment as a challenge to international law 
The birth of this investment arbitration system corresponds with the foreign direct investment 
(FDI) boom, which began in the 1960s and peaked in 2011.14 Aided by rapid advances in 
telecommunications and transportation technology, the total global inflows and outflows of 
foreign direct investment grew from $204 billion worldwide in 1990 to over $1.56 trillion in 
2011. 15   
 
Foreign direct investment has now become an integral part of the international economic system 
and international law has had to adapt its processes accordingly.16 It has been faced with new 
and emerging international actors, foreign investors, who demand legal recourse when a 
sovereign state allegedly fails to fulfill its obligations in respect of their investment.17 Before the 
use of BITs, few mechanisms existed to make state promises about the treatment of foreign 
investment credible.18 The customary international Hull rule held that “no government is entitled 
  
12  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States, 
575 UNTS 159 (opened for signature 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966) [ICSID 
Convention], art 53. 
13  Alan Redfern and others (2004) Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (4th ed,  
Sweet & Maxwell, London) at 3. 
14  Ayouni Saief Eddine and Issaoi Fakhri and Brahim Salem Financial Liberalisation, Foreign Direct  
Investment (FDI) and Economic Growth: A Panel Dynamic Data Validation (MPRA Paper No. 56385, 9  
June 2014) at 2. 
15  Lisa Sachs and Karl Sauvant The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment  
Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) at 
xxviii; UNCTAD “FDI inflows, by region and economy, 1990-2014 annex 1” (24 June 2015) UNCTAD 
World Investment Report 2015: Annex Tables www.unctad.org. 
16  Dugan, above n 3, at 6. 
17  At 6. 
18  Zachary Elkins and others “Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960- 
2000” in Michael Waibel and others The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006) 369 at 371. 
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to expropriate private property, for whatever purpose, without provision for prompt, adequate 
and effective payment therefor.” Yet, this rule was not enforceable nor did it provide any 
affirmative state protection to foreign investors.19 As a result, such investors had to rely solely 
on domestic courts, which provided few opportunities for compensation.20 Sovereign immunity 
and other jurisdictional limitations prevented the enforceability of decisions and issues of bias 
and procedural irregularity routinely arose in host state courtrooms.21  
 The bilateral investment treaty as a new source of legal protection 
This glaring lack of legal protection forced investors to go looking for answers and they found 
them in bilateral investment treaties.22 The first BIT made its debut in 1959 and built on the 
international law principles of “minimum standards of treatment” and “state responsibility” to 
provide direct protection for foreign investors at international law.23 Typically, a BIT obliges a 
host state to accord foreign investors with “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and 
security”, as well as obliging the state to pay “fair and just compensation” in the event of an 
expropriation of an investor’s assets.24 Since the 1970s, almost all BITs have provided direct 
recourse for foreign investors to enforce these obligations through international arbitration.25  
 The expanding scope of international investment arbitration 
International arbitration is a dynamic dispute resolution mechanism that varies depending on 
legal form and jurisdiction.26 It does, however, have four central defining features. It is an 
alternative to national courts, is a private mechanism for dispute resolution, is selected and 
  
19  Norwegian Shipowners Claims Arbitration (US v Norway) (1992) 1 Rep International Arbitration 307.
 See, also, Elkins, above n 20, at 372. 
20  Asha Kaushal “Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash Against the Foreign  
Investment Regime (2005) 50 (2) Harvard ILJ 491 at 498. 
21  Dugan, above n 3, at 13. 
22  For an example of a typical BIT, see the 1994 US Prototype Bilateral Investment Treaty, office of the  
Chief Counsel for International Commerce [US Propotype BIT].  
23  Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Germany-Pakistan (signed on 25 November 1959,  
registered on 26 March 1963). 
24  Jeswald W Salacuse “BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on  
Foreign Investment in Developing Countries” (1990) 24(3) INT’L L 663 at 667-68; Dugan, above n 3, at 
52 and 54. 
25  Kaushal, above n 20, at 498. 
26  Julian D M Lew, Loukas A Mistelis and Stefan M Lrokk Comparative International Commercial  
Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2003) at 1.  
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controlled by the parties, and results in a final and binding determination of parties’ rights and 
obligations.27  
 
The foundation of modern international arbitration is an agreement by two parties to submit any 
disputes that arise between them to arbitration.28 Party consent of this nature is usually spelt out 
in an arbitration clause contained in the main contract or set down in a separate submission to 
arbitration.29 Yet, in the case of investment treaty disputes, party consent may not be spelt out at 
all.30 The only indication of a host state’s intention to arbitrate with an investor may be what can 
be inferred from the general arbitration provision contained in a state-state BIT.  
 
Prior to the 1990s, this alone was not sufficient to amount to party consent.31 However, during 
the negotiation of the World Banks’ ICSID Convention, it was first recognised that “states could 
consent to arbitrate further disputes by making an offer to arbitrate in a foreign investment code 
or law, or by means of a treaty.”32 Since then, BITs began to routinely provide for investor-state 
arbitration with unqualified state consent. The Chad-Italy BIT of 1969 was the first, but the 
majority of all BITs signed since have included a dispute resolution clause that explicitly 
authorises investor-state treaty arbitration.33   
 
The significance of this was not immediately realised and in in the formative years of investor-
state arbitration, tribunals limited their jurisdiction to those circumstances in which a specific 
arbitration agreement existed alongside a BIT.34 However, this changed in 1990 when the 
tribunal in APPL v Sri Lanka ruled that it had authority to hear “claims exclusively based on a 
treaty provision.”35  This ruling was to have a snowball effect and very soon tribunals were 
  
27  At 3. 
28  Redfern, above n 13, at 5. 
29  At 6. 
30  Gus Van Harten “Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law” (2006)  
17(1) EJIL 121 at 128-129. 
31  Andrew Newcombe and Lluís Paradell Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of  
Treatment (Kluwer Law International, Netherlands, 2009) at 44. 
32  At 44. 
33  Chad-Italy BIT (signed 06 November 1969, entered into force on 06 March 1969). 
art VII; Jan Paulsson “Arbitration without Privity” (1995) 10(2) ICSID Rev 232  
at 233. 
34  Van Harten, above n 30, at 123. 
35  Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v Republic of Sri Lanka (Award)  ICSID ARB/87/3, 27 June 1990 at  
[18] and [38]. 
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routinely interpreting BITs as a “standing offer to arbitrate” that was accepted when an investor 
filed for arbitration.36 
 
This opened the door for foreign investors to bring claims for compensation whenever a host 
state’s action caused them quantifiable loss and was in breach of a BIT’s investor protections. It 
signaled the birth of investment treaty arbitration and enabled BITs to become one of the most 
enforceable mechanisms of international law.37  It also encouraged their proliferation and in the 
1990s, the number of BITs swelled by over 1,500.38 Today there are over 3,250 BITs worldwide 
and an average of forty new investment treaty claims are lodged with international each year.39   
B Issues in Investment Treaty Arbitration 
The proliferation of investment treaty arbitration over the last two decades has been piece-meal 
and ad hoc. Nonetheless, the awards rendered in the 610 known ISDS cases have shaped a 
specific and unique line of arbitral jurisprudence.40 Today, there exists a highly detailed system 
of investment treaty arbitration, one which covers a complex web of legal relationships, 
international law treaties and arbitral forums, and which has its own legal issues. In particular, it 
is mired by five central concerns: confidentiality, consent, limited recourse against awards, 
narrowly defined parties, and inconsistency. 
 Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is a central pillar of commercial arbitration and is one of the main reasons why 
parties choose to submit a dispute to arbitration.41 However, it has led to a number of issues in 
the investor-state context. Unlike other commercial entities, states have sovereign rights and 
obligations to their citizens. These obligations require states to make decisions in the interests of 
their nationals and to inform them about the outcome of those decisions.42 Public access to 
  
36  Jan Paulsson “Arbitration without Privity” (1995) 10(2) ICSID Rev 232 at 233. 
37  Van Harten, above n 30, at 123. 
38  UNCTAD The Entry Into Force of Bilateral Investment Treaties, above n 11. 
39  UNCTAD “Recent Developments in Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)” 1 IIA Issues Note at 6. 
40  Commission, above n 7, at 130-158.   
41  Dugan, above n 3, at 706. 
42  A T Guzman “Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral  
Investment Treaties (1998) 38 Virginia Journal of International Law 639 at 639.  
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information is widely recognized as a fundamental principle of judicial decision-making in 
domestic and international courts and yet such access is noticeably absent in ISDS.43  
 
While one should not overstate the level of secrecy that exists in investment treaty arbitration, it 
is still common practice for the content of submissions and awards to be kept secret whenever 
either of the disputing parties does not consent to publication.44 While the internet has made 
investment treaty awards much more accessible, public access is about more than how many 
people “get their hands on the decision”. 45 Public access requires that the views and arguments 
of disputing parties and adjudicators are publicly scrutinised, not just their final statements or 
awards. 46  
 
While a closed approach may be tolerable for the resolution of commercial disputes, when 
transplanted into investor-state arbitration it allows the legitimacy of sovereign decisions to be 
determined with finality and in secret.47 There is certainly a place for confidentiality in investor-
state arbitration, as it “enables parties to fully present their case”; however, the scope of this right 
must be better articulated.48  As long as the extent of confidentiality over arbitral proceedings 
remains a “discretionary right”, the scope of which is determined by the parties, the minimum 
standards of openness expected in public international law are not met.49  
 Consent to arbitration 
Party consent lies at the heart of arbitration.50 In a contract-based investor-state arbitration, 
consent flows from the contract between the parties.51 However, in treaty-based investment 
  
43  Van Harten, above n 10, at 97. 
44  Van Harten, above n 10, at 161. 
45  See, for example, Andrew Newcombe and others “Investment Treaty Arbitration Law: Newly Posted  
Awards, Decisions and Materials” italaw www.italaw.com 
46  Mabel I Egonu “Investor-State Arbitration Under ICSID: A Case for Presumption Against  
Confidentiality” (2007) 24(5) JOIA 479 at 488. 
47  Van Harten, above n 10, at 160. 
48  Dugan, above n 3, at 707; See UPS v Canada (Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention  
and Participation as Amici Curiae) UNCITRAL, 17 October 2001 for an example of one of the first 
disputes to be made fully open to the public.  
49  Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage (eds) Fouchard Gaillard on International Commercial Arbitration  
(Kluwer Law International, The Hague, Netherlands, 2009) at 627-628. 
50  Paulsson, above n 36, at 233 
51  Van Harten, above n 10, at 63. 
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arbitration, there is no contract between the parties. Instead, the investment treaty is used as the 
basis for a host state’s consent to arbitrate with foreign investors as a group.52  
 
This interpretation of BITs as a “standing offers to arbitrate”, coupled with a wide interpretation 
of what qualifies as a protected “investment”, has led to a large number claims that host states 
could never have foreseen.53 By enabling investors to bring claims against states, without any 
requirement of individualised consent between the parties, some commentators allege that 
tribunals have given investors a “blank cheque which may be cashed for an unknown amount at 
a future, and as yet unknown, date.”54 The legitimate extent to which a state can submit itself to 
a particular mechanism for controlling its own sovereign acts remains an issue of much 
discussion.55 
 Limited Recourse against Awards 
The limited recourse against awards rendered in investment treaty arbitration is another issue of 
concern. When compared with domestic legal systems, investment arbitration contains few 
mechanisms to hold tribunals to account for their interpretation of the applicable law.  Because 
the system has incorporated the enforcement structure of international commercial arbitration, 
awards are considered to be the equivalent of a final judgment of the court of a contracting 
party.56 This means that international arbitrators have little or no judicial supervision over their 
interpretation of broadly framed investor protections.57  
 
Where domestic adjudicators can be held accountable on matters of law by way of an appeal to 
the court, no such appeal is possible in investment arbitration. While it is true that investment 
treaties do subject tribunals to review by domestic courts (or in the case of ICSID arbitration, to 
review by an ICSID annulment committee), in both instances the grounds for review are very 
limited.58 Domestic courts will only overturn an award where they find a jurisdictional error, 
  
52  J G Merillis “The Means of Dispute Settlement” in Malcom D Evans (ed) International Law (2nd ed,  
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) at 542. 
53  Paulsson, above n 36, at 233. 
54  Redfern, above n 13, at 21-22. 
55  See, for example, Paulsson, above n 36, at 250; Ole Spiermann “Individual Rights, State Interests and the  
Power to Waive ICSID Jurisdiction under Bilateral Investment Treaties” (2004) 20 Arb Int’l 179 at 180. 
56  ICSID Convention, above n 12, art 54. 
57  Van Harten, above n 10, at 153. 
58  ICSID Convention, above n 12, art 53-5; Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign  
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procedural impropriety, or serious violation of public policy.59 They are not authorised to correct 
errors of law by tribunals.60 Annulment committees too may only intervene on the grounds that 
a tribunal was not properly constituted, manifestly exceeded its powers, was corrupt, departed 
from a fundamental rule of procedure, or failed to state the reasons for its award.61 To the 
detriment of accountability and consistency, there is no possibility of judicial review to correct 
errors of law.62  
 Parties to the arbitration 
International arbitration is fundamentally a bilateral method of dispute resolution, which 
operates inter partes without outside interference. Yet, while party autonomy makes sense in the 
commercial arbitration context where the sole aim of the process is to develop tailored, workable 
and “one-off” solutions to contractual disputes, it is often unhelpful when dealing with the 
regulatory actions of sovereign states.63 
 
Prior to the proliferation of BITs, disputes over sovereign regulatory actions were normally 
resolved through inter-state diplomacy, or, in extreme cases, were heard before the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ).64 However, investment arbitration has privatised these public international 
claims. It has given full custody of the process to the investor, who can decide the manner and 
extent of adjudication, and has redefined the resolution of investor-state disputes as a one-way 
system of regulatory adjudication.65  
 
This obscures a holistic view of the state as a sovereign entity, responsible for the welfare of its 
citizens and instead focuses the dispute solely on the state’s commercial obligations to a foreign 
investor.66 There are many good reasons why a state might alter its regulatory environment in a 
way that jeopardises the profitability of foreign investments. Public health, the protection of the 
  
Arbitral Awards 330 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 10 June 1958, entered into force 9 June 1959) [the 
New York Convention]. 
59  Van Harten, above n 10, at 155. 
60  United Mexican States v Metalclad Corporation (2001) 38 CELR 284, at [50]-[56]; Attorney General of 
 Canada v SD Myers, Inc [2004] 3 FCR 368 at [42]-[44]. 
61  ICSID Convention, above n 56, art 52. 
62  Dugan, above n 3, at 700. 
63  Van Harten, above n 30, at 129. 
64  Van Harten, above n 10, at 97. 
65  At 120. 
66  Alvarez, above n 5, at 76. 
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environment and financial security are but a few examples.67 Yet, because investment treaty 
arbitration transplants the commercial model of arbitration into the regulatory sphere, these often 
fail to gain traction.68 
 Consistency 
Consistency has always come second to accuracy in international arbitration and many have 
expressed concern that the three-person arbitral tribunals, established on an ad hoc basis to 
resolve each investor claim, are not producing consistent international investment law.69 Such 
inconsistency might have traditionally gone unnoticed. However, with the increasing number of 
publicly available awards, the issue of differential treatment in the same or similar circumstances 
has been brought into the spotlight.70   
 
Such inconsistency fuels criticisms of investment arbitration and emphasises the ad hoc nature 
of the investment treaty arbitration process.71 Arbitration lacks a system of binding precedent or 
stare decisis, meaning tribunals are free to depart from previous decisions. It also lacks an 
appellate mechanism, and instead employs a ‘flat’ organisational structure with little or no 
cohesion between arbitral fora or between tribunals adjudicating the same factual dispute.72 This 
means that there are few safeguards to ensure that awards adhere to basic standards of 
consistency and reliability. It also increases the risk that the interpretation of investor protections 
might be distorted by a trend of arbitral decisions.73 This issue in particular has become more 
pronounced in the last decade as arbitration has attempted to address new sorts of claims – those 
of multiple, or even whole classes of, investors.  
C The New Frontier: Resolving Concurrent Claims 
 
  
67  See, for example, Uursula Kriebaum “Privatizing Human Rights: The Interface between International  
Investment Protection and Human Rights” (2006) 3 Transnational Dispute Management 165. 
68  Van Harten, above n 10, at 57. 
69  Alvarez, above n 5, at 260.  
70  Compare, for example, CMS Gas Transmission Co v Argentina (Award) ICSID ARB/01/10 (12 May  
2005) and LG&E Energy Corp v Argentina (Decision on Liability) ICSID ARB/02/1 (3 October 2006). 
71  See, for example, Susan Franck “The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing  
International Law through Inconsistent Decisions” (2005) 73 Fordham law Review 1521. 
72  Van Harten, above n 10, at 175-184. 
73  See, for example, the discussion in Sempra Energy International v Argentina Republic (Annulment  
Proceeding) ICSID ARB/02/16 (29 June 2010) at [208]. 
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Notwithstanding the aforementioned issues, investment arbitration has, for the most part, been 
able to function effectively as a method of resolving one-off disputes between an investor and a 
state. However, with the recent spike in the number of multiple proceedings brought against host 
states, the cracks in investment arbitration, which are briefly outlined above, have begun to 
seriously threaten its stability as the premier method of adjudicating disputes between multiple 
investors and states.  
 What are concurrent claims and why are they different from one off claims? 
Arbitration is, at its roots, a bilateral method of dispute resolution. It was designed to enable 
tailored solutions to protracted issues between two parties.74 Yet, when applied to investor-state 
disputes, it has been confronted with multiple claims arising from the same event.75 Such claims 
might involve 5 investors or they might involve 5000, but they all share a number of key 
qualities. They arise out of the same or similar circumstances, involve the same or similar legal 
relationships, and involve the same or similar issues of law – principally, the legality (or 
otherwise) of a state’s adjustment to its regulatory landscape.  
 
Whenever multiple claims are alleged against a host state, regardless of the number, there is a 
fundamental need for consistency between awards.76 The same need does not arise in respect of 
singular claims. In such cases, there is no risk of inconsistent decisions on the same facts and 
tribunals are free to prioritise accuracy at the expense of consistency.77 Yet, whenever multiple 
investors submit claims against a single host state, the risk of inconsistent decisions is 
considerable and tribunals must strive to deliver awards that are not only accurate but also 
consistent with one another. The principal reason for this is that the factual circumstances out of 
which concurrent claims arise are virtually identical and parties legitimately expect that their 
claims will be handled in a virtually identical, or at least a very similar, manner.78  
  
74  Van Harten, above n 10, at 59-60. 
75  Jamie Shookman “Too Many Forums for Investment Disputes? ICSID Illustrations of Parallel  
Proceedings and Analysis” 27(4) Journal of International Arbitration 361 at 365. 
76  Gilles Cuniberti “Parallel Litigation and Foreign Investment Dispute Settlement” (2006) 21 ICSID Rev  
381 at 395. 
77  Viejo Heiskanen and Sanrine Giroud “Aristotle’s Statistics: Consistency and Accuracy in International  
Mass Claims” in Arthur Rovine Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation (Leiden, 
Brill Publishers, 2015) 109-123 at 110. 
78  Heiskanen and Giroud, above n 77, at 112. 
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 The conventional response of investment arbitration to concurrent claims 
Despite the fundamental importance of consistency when resolving concurrent claims, arbitral 
tribunals routinely contradict the approach of other tribunals to legal principle and deliver 
conflicting decisions on the same or a closely related issue.79  This differential treatment 
“highlights the lack of consistency of the legal order,” and where serious and repeated “may 
jeopardise investment arbitration’s legitimacy and credibility.”80 
 
The majority of all similar investment treaty claims are handled separately by different tribunals 
with little or no consolidation.81 Fundamental arbitral procedure dictates that, unless the parties 
agree otherwise, claims arising from the same general investment relationship and based on the 
same or related legal arguments ought to be brought before separate tribunals.82 In other words, 
arbitral rules set out that the claims of multiple investors are to be treated separately, in much 
the same way as any other investor’s claim.  
 
Yet, when multiple investor claims proceed without consolidation, the risk of inconsistency 
between awards grows considerably. The awards rendered in the wake of Argentina’s financial 
crisis in the early 2000s are one example of this.83 In that instance, a total of 10 arbitral decisions 
were issued - by tribunals in CMS, Enron, LG&E, Sempra, BG, National Grid, Continental 
Casualty and by annulment committees in CMS, Enron and Sempra.84 These decisions contain 
troubling inconsistencies in terms of fact-finding, logic and the law.85 All but one of these cases 
  
79  Shookman, above n 75, at 371. 
80  Cuniberti, above n 76, at 395. 
81  Catherine Yannaca-Small “Improving the System of Investor-State Dispute Settlement” in OECD  
International Investment Perspectives (OECD Publishing, 2006) 184 at 198. 
82  Campbell McLachlan and others International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles (1st ed,  
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) at 88. 
83  Alvarez, above n 5, at 261-263. 
84  CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentina (Award) ICSID ARB/01/8, 12 May 2005; Enron v  
Argentine Republic (Award) ICSID ARB/01/3, 22 May 2007; LG&E Capital Corp and LG&E 
International Inc. v Argentine Republic (Decision on Liability) ICSID ARB/02/1, 3 October 2006; Sempra 
Energy International v Argentine Republic (Award) ICSID ARB/02/16, 28 September 2007; BG Group 
Plc v Argentine Republic (Final Award) UNCITRAL, 24 December 2007; National Grid Plc v Argentine 
Republic (Award) UNCITRAL, 3 November 2008; Continental Casualty Co. v Argentine Republic 
(Award) ICSID ARB/03/9, 5 September 2008; CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine Republic 
(Annulment Proceeding) ICSID ARB/01/8, 25 September 2007; Enron v Argentine Republic (Annulment 
Proceeding) ICSID ARB/01/3, 30 July 2010; and Sempra Energy International v Argentine Republic 
(Annulment Proceeding) ICSID ARB/02/16, 29 June 2010.  
85  Alvarez, above n 5, at 263. 
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involved a foreign investor in a now privatised public utility and all but two involved the United 
States-Argentina BIT. Furthermore, in all of these decisions, the principal defence was the same: 
that the measures under challenge were a “necessary and excusable response to a serious 
economic and political crisis.”86 Yet despite these similarities, and despite the fact that Argentina 
was found liable by all of the original panels that addressed these claims, substantial 
inconsistencies among the cases have emerged over time. Not least as later tribunals reconsidered 
the merits of Argentina’s defence and as annulment committees revisited the original decisions.87 
In particular, the tribunals reached differing conclusions with respect to the governing law of the 
dispute; the interpretations of the relevant BIT guarantees; and most significantly, on whether 
Argentina had a valid defence of necessity.88  
 
In spite of repeated consideration by distinguished groups of arbitrators, these inconsistencies 
remain unresolved. They suggest that ISDS does not produce the stable and predictable “rules 
of the road” that some had anticipated and they also reflect poorly on the effectiveness of 
arbitration as a means of resolving investor-state disputes.89 
 
After all, consistency and predictability are underlying values in all judicial systems, particularly 
those addressing large-scale public interest issues.90 While the flexibility of tribunals to deviate 
from past decisions is part of what makes investment arbitration successful, this flexibility must 
be balanced against the need for investors and states to be confident that the actions they take 
will be handled by tribunals in a predictable and consistent manner. In the condemning language 
of one prominent commentator, “any system where diametrically opposed decisions can legally 
coexist cannot last long. It shocks the sense of rule of law or fairness.”91 
  
86  See Treaty between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic concerning the Reciprocal  
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, United States-Argentina (signed 14 November 1991, entered 
into force on 20 October 1994). 
87  Alvarez, above n 5, at 263. 
88  Compare, for example, Sempra Energy International v Argentina (Award) ICSID ARB/02/16, 28  
September 2007 at [376]-[378]; LG&E, above n 70, at [257]-[258]; and Enron v Argentina (Annulment 
Proceeding) ICSID ARB/01/3, 30 July 2010 at [368]-[395]. 
89  Alvarez, above n 5, at 352. 
90  Gus Van Harten Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (1st ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford,  
2007) at 175-184. 
91  Nigel Blackaby, of Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, quoted in MD Goldhaber “Wanted: A World 
 Investment Court” (2004) 3 Transnational Dispute Management 1 at 2.  
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 Novel approaches to parallel claims in investment arbitration 
Over the last decade, the need for greater cohesion and uniformity between separate arbitral 
decisions has begun to resonate with stakeholders. They have developed a number of arbitral 
innovations aimed at improving consistency.92 For instance, arbitral rules have begun to include 
consolidation and joinder provisions, it has become good practice to appoint the same arbitrators 
to hear separate cases on similar facts, and a representative has been permitted to bring a 
consolidated claim on behalf of thousands of investors.93  
 
Outside of the investment context, international arbitration has also developed a number of 
unique solutions to address multi-party arbitral disputes. Most notably, special tribunals have 
been created to deal with multiple disputes arising out of a single crisis event.94 Such tribunals 
are free to shape arbitral procedures according to the characteristics of a specific dispute and 
they have proven to be particularly effective in resolving disputes arising out of major crises.95 
The Iran-US Claims Tribunal (created in 1981 following the Iranian revolution) and the United 
Nations Compensation Commission (created in 1990 following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait) are 
two significant examples.96  
 
Although tribunals of this nature require political willpower and significant resources, making 
them an unlikely fit for investment treaty arbitration, they demonstrate the importance of 
developing innovative ways to tailor arbitral procedure to multi-party disputes. At present, little 
or no such tailoring occurs in investment treaty arbitration and the problem of inconsistency 
continues to proliferate.  
  
92  See, for example, Aurélia Antonietti “The 2006 Amendments to the ICSID Rules and  
Regulations and the Additional Facility Rules” (2006) 21(2) ICSID Review 427-448.  
93  See, for example, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules   
(15 August 2010) (UNCITRAL Secretariat, Vienna, 2010) [UNCITRAL Rules], art 17(4); International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings in 
Convention, Regulations and Rules (ICSID, Washington, 2003) [ICSID Rules], r 18; and, Abaclat and 
others v the Argentine Republic (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) ICSID ARB/07/5, 4 August 2011. 
94  Gabrielle Kauffman-Kohler “Consolidation of Proceedings in Investment Arbitration: How can multiple  
proceedings arising out of the same or related situations be handled efficiently” (2006) 21(1) ICSID Review 
59 at 74. 
95  At 74. 
96  For more information on the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, see www.iusct.net; for more information on the 
 United Nations Compensation Commission, see www.uncc.ch.  
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As will be outlined in Part III and IV, the current method of resolving investor-state disputes 
(particularly those arising out of the Energy Charter Treaty) is inefficient and has failed to 
effectively resolve the Spanish solar crisis. It requires intervention at a policy level in order to 
ensure consistency is maintained between decisions and to safeguard the legitimacy of 
investment arbitration itself.  
 
II  Understanding the Spanish Solar Crisis 
 
In order to fully understand how multiple claims against a host state are handled by investment 
arbitration, this paper will critically examine the processes employed in the currently pending 
Spanish solar arbitrations. These arbitrations stem from a sector-wide investor crisis and involve 
upwards of 90 claimant investors. This section of the paper will provide an overview of the 
factual circumstances surrounding the Spanish solar crisis and will establish how it led to the 
largest ever investment arbitration under the ECT. In particular, it will provide a background to 
Spain’s solar PV investment profile, will look at the causes and effects of the solar boom and 
subsequent crisis, and will outline the basis of foreign investors’ claims against Spain.  
A Solar PV Investment in Spain 
 The renewable energy targets of the European Union 
The European Union (EU) boasts one of the strongest reputations for renewable energy 
production and consumption in the world. It holds 40% of the world’s renewable energy patents 
and 44% of the world’s renewable electricity capacity (excluding hydropower).97 To a large 
extent, this impressive record can be attributed to a legislative climate that is, and has been for 
some time, favourable for renewable energy investment.98 The latest EU energy target commits 
the union to meeting 20% of its energy needs from renewable energy sources by 2020.99 It also 
  
97  Cécile Kerebel “Renewable Energy” (1 March 2015) European Parliament www.europarl.europa.eu. 
98  Lean Kitzing and others “Renewable energy policies in Europe: Converging or Diverging?” (2012) 51  
Energy Policy 192 at 192; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
OJ C 115/47 (signed 13 December 2007, came into force 1 December 2009) [TFEU], art 194. 
99  Directive 2009/28 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and 
subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77 and 2003/30 [2009] OJ L 140, recital 13. 
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commits all member states to legally binding national targets for 2020 renewable energy 
production.  
 Spain’s Feed-in Tariff policy 
For some time, Spain has embraced the EU’s renewable energy targets and since the Electric 
Power Act of 1997, Spain has been operating a Feed-in Tariff (FiT) policy.100 Under this policy, 
consumers are charged an additional fee for energy consumption, which is then paid to renewable 
energy producers at a rate determined according to the technology they use or the size of their 
operation.101 In other words, renewable energy electricity plants receive a preferential price for 
the electricity they feed into the grid. This Act established a system which could be annually 
revised and which successfully encouraged stable but low levels of renewable energy 
deployment. Because of the significant levels of solar radiation in Spain, the scheme was targeted 
exclusively at producers in the Solar PV sector. 
 
For the first seven years of its operation, the Spanish FiT programme functioned adequately; 
however, many policymakers believed it could be improved. In 2004, Royal Decree 436/2004 
was passed which amended the Spanish FiT scheme, introducing an aggregate target of 150 
megawatts (MW) of solar PV production, setting price support levels as a percentage of the 
average electricity tariff, and establishing a system of four yearly rather than annual review. 
Overall, this new regulation led to more favourable treatment for both large and small solar 
operations.  It further liberalised energy markets and had a significant positive impact on both 
domestic and foreign investment in Solar PV. However, it failed to introduce best-practice FiT 
design elements, such as the digressive FiT rate in place in Germany, and also caused a strong 
rise in household electricity prices.102 
 
In order to ameliorate the pressures on households, the Spanish government amended the scheme 
a second time, in June 2007, by Royal Decree 661/2007. This regulation de-linked the FiT rate 
from the average electricity tariff and obliged Solar PV installations to accept a standard fixed 
  
100  Spanish Royal Decree 2818/1998. 
101  Toby Couture and others A Policymaker’s Guide to Feed-in Tariff Policy Decision (NREL, Colorado,  
2010) at V. 
102  Anne Held and others Feed-In Systems in Germany, Spain and Slovenia: A Comparison (Karlsruhe,  
Fraunhofer Publishing, 2007) at 29.    
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FiT rate. In an effort to foster investment in larger-scale Solar PV facilities, which were 
considered cheaper per unit (those in the 100kW/h – 10MW/h bracket), it also increased the 
tariffs awarded to such projects by as much as 82 percent. This amendment made Spain’s feed-
in tariffs the most generous in Europe and such generosity did not go un-noticed.  
 
By 2008, Spain was hosting half of the word’s new solar energy installations by wattage and 
companies from all over Europe and the United States were flocking to Spain. Within the space 
of a year, the number of annual solar PV installations rose five-fold, from 544 megawatts to 2708 
megawatts.103 Unfortunately, this growth was beyond anything the Spanish government had 
foreseen and happened to coincide with general economic downturn caused by the banking crisis 
that hit Spain in 2008. The Spanish Government found itself confronted with a growing feed-in 
tariff deficit that it was in no position to pay.  
B The Causes and Effects of the Spanish Solar Crisis 
 The crux of the crisis 
The dominant factors behind Spain’s solar boom are well known. FiT rates were too high, they 
were provided at a time when technology costs were decreasing, and they were not designed to 
account for changes in technology costs.104 According to Spanish public officials, the tariffs were 
intended to provide developers with an internal rate of rate return of between 5 and 9 percent, 
but, in actuality, provided between 10 to 15 percent returns to many investors.105 
 
All of these factors worked to create a Solar PV market so lucrative that, between June and 
September 2008, nearly 500MW of solar energy capacity (enough to power 375,000 Californian 
households for a year) was installed every month. This exponential growth caused a 
corresponding growth in the costs of the FiT scheme and total subsidies payable to PV generators 
skyrocketed from 194 million euros in 2007 to 2.6 billion euros in 2009.106 The Spanish 
  
103  Pablo Del Rio and Pere Mir-Artigues A Cautionary Tale: Spain’s Solar PV Investment Bubble (Institute  
for Sustainable Development, Winnipeg, 2014) at 7. 
104  At 14. 
105  At 12. 
106  International Energy Agency Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Spain – Executive Summary (Paris,  
International Energy Agency, 2015) at 10.  
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Government was unable to meet these rising costs and by 2009 had accumulated a huge tariff 
deficit equivalent to almost 3% of Spanish GDP.107 
 
Perhaps Spain could have withstood this solar boom had it not been for the financial crisis, which 
began in 2007 and deepened in 2008. This crisis hastened the end of Spain’s expansive fiscal 
cycle and had major repercussions for Spain’s energy market. While the crisis was largely one 
of private indebtedness, it saw sovereign debt in Spain rise from 40% of GDP in 2007 to more 
than 100% of GDP in the first six months of 2013.108  In response to this deteriorating fiscal 
position, the Spanish government saw the gradual removal of all FiTs as its only option.109 
 The Government’s response 
As soon as the true scale of the solar boom became evident, the Spanish government took a 
number of steps to regress from its commitments to Solar PV producers. Within the space of 
three years, it passed various amendments and legislative decrees (namely Royal Decree 
1565/2010, Royal Decree 14/2010 and Royal Decree 9/2013), which collectively re-classified 
PV installations into new categories, introduced capacity quotas, retroactively reduced tariffs 
levels to near zero, implemented a cap on operating hours and imposed a moratorium on new 
projects.110  All of these reforms had the effect of grinding the Spanish solar market to a halt.111  
 
Yet this was not the end of the regulatory changes. On 12 July 2013, the Spanish Government 
approved a package of urgent legislative measures aimed at eliminating the Spanish electricity 
deficit. The adoption of Royal Decree 15/2012 and Royal Decree 2/2014 effectively abolished 
the feed-in tariff system, replacing it with a backdated remuneration scheme which paid energy 
producers on the basis of their installed capacity and exploitation costs, not their electricity 
production.112  
 
  
107  Banco de España “Financial Accounts, Debt of the non-financial sectors as % of GDP” (1 April 2013)  
Banco de España  http://www.bde.es.  
108  Celia Olivet and Pia Enberhardt Profiting from Crisis (Transnational Institute and Corporate  
Europe Observatory, Amsterdam, 2014) at 27. 
109  Ioannis Glinavos “Solar Eclipse: Investment Treaty Arbitration and Spain’s Photovoltaic Troubles”  
(2015) Social Science Research Network 1 at 4. 
110  At 4-5. 
111  Del Rio and Mir-Artigues, above n 103, at 18. 
112  Glinavos, above n 109, at 5. 
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Throughout the regulatory changes, the Spanish Government maintained that all cuts to FiTs 
were necessary in order to reduce its electricity tariff deficit, as well as to meet the requests of 
the EU for stringent cuts to the public budget. Defending the reforms, José Manuel Soria, the 
Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism stated, “if we did nothing, the only two alternatives 
would [have] either be[en] bankruptcy of the system or an increase of the price to consumers of 
more than 40 percent.”113 
 Kick-back from domestic investors 
Unsurprisingly, Solar PV investors were highly critical of Spain’s actions and demanded 
compensation for their losses. For domestic investors, many of whom had switched their 
livelihoods to Solar PV and faced financial ruin as a result of the FiT cuts, this meant bringing 
claims before the domestic courts of Spain.  
 
In 2011, fourteen domestic producers filed a suit against the Spanish government, hoping to pave 
the way for the estimated 30,000 Spanish households who had invested in solar PV.114 Yet, their 
claim was unsuccessful. In a ruling handed down in January 2014, the Supreme Court of Spain 
held that domestic producers “do not have a right…for the economic regime that regulates the 
retributions they receive not to be changed.”115 In short, they are subject to all the regulatory 
decisions of their democratic government.  
 Foreign investors commence international arbitral proceedings 
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the extensive investor protections outlined in Part I, the position 
in respect of Spain’s liability to foreign solar PV investors has proven to be very different. 
Thanks to the Energy Charter Treaty, foreign investors have the mandate to bypass the domestic 
courts and directly challenge the Spanish government’s actions before international arbitral 
tribunals.116 Like other investment treaties, the ECT contains enforceable investment protection 
provisions and provides investors from signatory states with recourse to investment arbitration 
whenever their investment in another signatory state is threatened.  As of 2015, almost every 
  
113  Suzanne Daley “Spain’s Solar Pullback Threatens Pocketbooks” (5 January 2014) New York Times  
 www.nytimes.com. 
114  El País “Supreme Court Backs Cuts to the Solar Power Producers’ Earnings” (21 January 2014)  El País  
www.elpais.com  
115  Above n 114. 
116  ECT, above n 1, art 26. 
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foreign investor present in Spain had taken the opportunity to initiate arbitral proceedings under 
the ECT. 
 
Although the precise number of foreign investors who have submitted claims against Spain is 
unknown, as of July 2015, twenty separate cases were publicly registered with the ECT 
Secretariat.117 All are currently pending. These cases collectively involve over ninety foreign 
investors, who each demand full compensation for their losses, alleging that the revocation of 
FiTs was contrary to article 10 (fair and equitable treatment) and article 13 (expropriation) of the 
ECT. Although confidentiality measures have precluded the publication of precise details 
regarding the investors’ claims, one claimant publicly requests 60 million euros for each year 
until the dispute is resolved, while another claimant, on behalf of a group of 14 investors known 
as the PV investors, requests between 600 million euros and 2 billion euros in damages.118 The 
Spanish solar arbitrations provide insightful and highly relevant insight into the way in which 
multiple related claims against a single host state are resolved through investment arbitration.  
 
III Adjudicating Multiple Investor Claims: The Spanish Solar Arbitrations 
 
This section of the paper will focus on the Spanish solar crisis as a case study of concurrent 
claims. It will examine how various arbitral tribunals have dealt with the claims of over ninety 
foreign investors in the Spanish solar market. In particular, it will examine the nature of the 
investors’ claims under the ECT, how they are being handled procedurally, what safeguards exist 
to ensure consistency between awards, and (as these disputes are still pending) whether such 
consistency is likely to occur in practice.  
A The Unique Nature of the Spanish Solar Investors’ Claims 
 The similarities between the claims of foreign investors in Spanish Solar PV 
It is no longer uncommon for investor crises to be adjudicated through multiple investment 
arbitrations against a host state. Yet, the Spanish solar crisis is unique in its potential for 
  
117  Energy Charter Secretariat “Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases” (16 June 2015) Energy  
Charter Treaty www.encharter.org 
118  José Luis Iriarte and Lupicinio Rodriguez “The Increasing Number and Methods of Arbitration Claims  
Brought Against Spain for its Renewable Energy Measures” (29 May 2014) Lexology www.lexology.com  
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collaborative arbitration. Almost all national crises that have led to arbitral claims in the past, 
and which have subsequently become fodder for academic debate on inconsistency, have 
involved multiple BITs and contractual agreements, investors from various different sectors, 
claims of markedly different scales, and a host of different legal arguments.119 The same cannot 
be said for the Spanish solar crisis. In fact, it represents as perfect an example as could be found 
of a homogenous arbitral dispute between multiple investors and a host state.120  
 
Firstly, the claim is based almost entirely on obligations enshrined in one investment treaty, the 
Energy Charter Treaty. The fact that all investor claims are based on the same legal standards 
enshrined in the ECT links the investors’ claims in a way that would not be possible under 
separate BITs. Even where two BITs contain the same investment protections, the interpretations 
of those protections may legitimately differ due to the context and purpose of the specific BITs. 
The same differentiation does not occur in claims under the ECT, not least because it is a 
multilateral investment treaty with a common objective – the liberalisation of trade and 
investment in the European energy market. 
 
Secondly, the Spanish solar arbitrations involve investments in only one sector, Solar PV. 
Though there are different types of solar PV investment, foreign investors almost exclusively 
invested in larger solar parks, those in the 100kW/h – 10MW/h bracket, which were deemed 
more profitable.121 The investors are also of a very similar type. While some renewable energy 
developers have brought claims, particularly in the last twelve months, the majority of claims 
are brought by private equity funds based in Western Europe.122 Among them are Dutch pension 
funds, the Deutsche Bank, insurance companies and other financial institutions.123 
 
Thirdly, the investors’ claims concern investments that were made at a similar time. The time an 
investment is made can have considerable implications on the outcome of an arbitral dispute.124 
  
119  Alvarez, above n 5, at 86 and 90. 
120  Iriarte and Rodriguez, above n 118. 
121  Begoña Barba de Alba “Las Renovables Cruzan el Charco Con Capital Riesgo” (25 October 2012) Cinco  
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122  Olivet and Enberhardt, above n 108, at 31. 
123  At 32. 
124  UNCTAD Fair and Equitable Treatment: Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II  
(UNCTAD, Geneva, 2012) at 71. 
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Therefore, it is worth noting that almost all foreign investment in Spain occurred between 2009 
and 2012.125 During this period, disquiet about solar subsidies was already widespread and the 
Spanish government had already begun cutting back FiTs. The investors that took advantage of 
the initial 2004 and 2007 subsidies were mostly national companies that built large-scale solar 
installations, which they later sold to foreign investors at auction.126 
 
Fourthly, and finally, the investors invoke the same causes of action arising out of the Energy 
Charter Treaty and object to the same state measures. They all dispute the validity of Spain’s 
energy reforms between 2009 and 2013 and invoke the same investor protections contained in 
the ECT. Article 10 of the ECT includes provisions relating to investment climate, fair and 
equitable treatment, protection and security, and freedom from discrimination.127 It sets a 
minimum standard for assessing violations of these promises. Article 13 of the ECT is more 
specific, providing that an investment “shall not be nationalised, expropriated or subjected to a 
measure or measures having effect equivalent to nationalisation.”128  The solar PV investors all 
invoke both articles 10 and 13, contending that unstable investment conditions and changes to 
energy policy amounted to unfair and inequitable treatment on the part of the Spanish 
government.129 They also suggest that the revocation of FiTs amounted to an indirect 
expropriation of their assets, on the basis that it resulted in a loss of expected profits.130  
 The untapped potential for consolidated resolution 
These four similarities make the Spanish solar crisis the perfect candidate for collaborative 
arbitral resolution. Consolidating the various claims into one, at least on the matters of law, 
would enable a single tribunal to deliver a cohesive and consistent decision in respect of Spain’s 
liability to investors for the revocation of FiTs. It has the potential to mitigate the risk of 
inconsistency, avoid excessive duplication, keep costs low, and ensure equality between 
  
125  Glinavos, above n 109, at 5. 
126  Olivet and Enberhardt, above n 108, at 29. 
127  ECT, above n 1, art 10. 
128  Art 13. 
129  Glinavos, above n 109, at 8. 
130  Rachel Nathanson “The Revocation of Clean-Energy Investment Economic-Support Systems as  
Indirect Expropriation Post – Nykomb: A Spanish Case Analysis” (2013) 98 Iowa Law Review 863 at  
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investors.131 Yet, achieving such consolidation in the current ad hoc system of arbitration is 
extremely difficult.  
 
Interestingly, the first investor claim provided hope for a consistent and cohesive arbitral 
outcome. In 2011, sixteen investors, who owned nearly a third of the installed power in Spain, 
banded together to bring a consolidated claim for 600 million euros. Their claim was brought 
under the ad hoc UNCITRAL arbitration rules and, while it still pending, the tribunal has since 
agreed to hear the claims together.132  
 
The second claim was filed in 2012 by two parent companies, Charanne and Construction 
Investments, under the rules of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.133 This claim unsettled 
the previously organised and clear PV Investors v Spain claim and instigated a new, separate 
procedural track under the SSC. This followed a different process and was to proceed at a 
different speed. It was further controversial as while the claimant companies were registered in 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg, they were ‘mailbox companies’ owned by Spanish 
businessmen.134 Following this case, two subsequent claims were registered under the rules of 
the SSC.  
 
By 2013, it became apparent that there was not going to be a consolidated or cohesive award 
handed down in respect of the Spanish solar crisis. By that time, four further claims had emerged, 
this time under the rules of ICSID. Over the next two years, the number of ICSID cases initiated 
against Spain jumped to sixteen and that number is still growing.  While some commentators 
were initially hopeful that a common arbitral panel might nevertheless be established, or that the 
same arbitrators might be asked to sit on each of the tribunals, neither has occurred.135  As either 
option would require the consent of the respondent state and the collaboration of all consenting 
claimants, it has proven to be too difficult a task. 136  
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132  The PV Investors, above n 4. 
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Instead, the twenty separate cases have been publicly lodged with the ECT secretariat under a 
host of different arbitral rules and with entirely different tribunals tasked with resolving each 
case.137  While it is not the intention of this paper to negate the right of a foreign investor to bring 
a claim independently of other investors, it is worth highlighting that despite the remarkable 
similarity between the Solar PV investors’ claims, they are proceeding separately at the expense 
of expediency and consistency.  
B Explaining the Unconsolidated Approach to Multiple Claims under the ECT 
The Spanish solar crises is the single largest event ever arbitrated under the ECT and the first 
instance in which the ECT has been invoked by multiple investors that have suffered damage 
arising from the same diplomatic, historic or other event.138 The way in which their claims are 
progressing has raised important questions about how multiple claims against a host state ought 
to be dealt with under the ECT.  
 Introduction to the Energy Charter Treaty 
The ECT opened for signature on 17 December 1994, came into force on 16 April 1998, and 
now has fifty-three state parties.139 It was originally envisaged as a purely European agreement 
that would facilitate greater energy cooperation between Western European States on the one 
hand, and those of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union on the other.140 The post-socialist 
states wanted greater access to investment capital from EU sources, which would enable them 
to expand their energy resource industries both domestically and for export.141 The EU member 
states wanted greater access to energy resources from their Eastern neighbours, in order that they 
might reduce their dependence on Middle Eastern oil.142 Yet, this initial European focus was 
seen by other states (particularly the USA) as protectionist and as monopolising access to Eastern 
  
137  Energy Charter Secretariat “Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases” (16 June 2015) Energy Charter  
Treaty www.encharter.org. 
138  Energy Charter Secretariat, above n 137. 
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Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) at 88. 
140  Peter Muchlinsi “The Energy Charter Treaty: Towards a New International order for Trade and  
Investment or a Case of History Repeating Itself” in Thomas Walde The Energy Charter Treaty: An East-
west Gateway for Investment and Trade (1st ed, Kluwer Law International, 1996) 205-225 at 205. 
141  At 205. 
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European energy sources. In response to these criticisms and intensive US lobbying, the 
European Charter initiative was thus expanded in 1991 and the US and other non-EU OECD 
members were invited to participate.143  
 
While the participation of the USA was warmly welcomed by many countries due to the 
importance of both the US energy industry and the USA as a trade partner, this participation was 
short-lived.144 In 1994, the USA refused to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty on the basis that that 
“current text…does not measure up to the standard expected by US investors.”145 US negotiators 
had advocated loudly for stronger investor protections at the pre-investment stage as well as 
more relaxed rules around discriminatory trade practices, but when neither approach was adopted 
(largely to keep Russia within the process), it chose to continue participating in the Treaty as an 
observer state only.146   
 
Thus, the ECT progressed without the USA and a basic, but extensive set of investor protections 
was drafted. The final investment promotion and protection regime (Part III) guarantees national 
treatment or mutual non-discrimination between all contracting parties, and further includes 
other protections common to BITs, such as fair and equitable treatment (FET) and protection 
from expropriation. In addition, it contains a number of novel protections such as a promise to 
treat investors no less favourably than the standard required by international law and a 
requirement to observe all obligations made to investors (i.e. an umbrella clause).147 Article 10 
also makes it clear that Contracting Parties are not merely forbidden from taking unreasonable 
actions to harm foreign investors and their investments; they are affirmatively obligated to create 
the conditions necessary for those investments to exist and to thrive.148 Despite being vaguely 
worded, it has been argued that these provisions represent the most extensive protection that is 
possible to negotiate in a multilateral instrument.149  
  
143  At 140. 
144  At 144. 
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 Introduction to arbitration under the ECT 
Part III of the ECT sets out the obligations undertaken by Contracting Parties to investors of 
other Contracting Parties, while Article 26 of Part V outlines how disputes between investors 
and States in respect of Part III are to be settled.150 Article 26 provides for the submission of 
disputes to arbitration. In particular, it gives eligible investors the flexibility to bring an arbitral 
claim to ICSID, to the arbitration institute of the SSC or under the ad hoc arbitration rules of 
UNCITRAL.151 This ‘cafeteria’ style of arbitration affords investors a wide choice of arbitral 
forum and is often rejected on the basis that it encourages ‘forum shopping.’ Its use in this 
context can be explained by a desire to please the large number of opposing parties involved in 
the ECT and also by the need to create a dispute settlement provision which Russia would agree 
to.152 In any case, the scope of investor choice between these institutions and rules has had a 
significant impact on investors’ claims.153  
 
Like many investment treaties, the ECT also contains a three-month waiting period for amicable 
settlement, but thereafter leaves it open to the claimant to choose whether to submit a dispute to 
the courts of the Contracting Party, to engage a previously agreed dispute settlement procedure 
or to initiate arbitration in one of the forums listed above.154 More often than not, after the 
expiration of the waiting period, aggrieved investors will submit a dispute directly to arbitration, 
usually through ICSID.155  
 
The powers of an arbitral tribunal constituted pursuant to Article 26 are largely delineated by the 
applicable rules (the ICSID Convention, the Additional Facility Rules, the SSC arbitral rules or 
the UNCITRAL arbitration rules), but broadly speaking, investment arbitration offers a better 
chance for investors to gain compensation than any of the alternative methods of recourse.156 
The ECT places no limits on an arbitral tribunal’s powers to make interim orders or orders for 
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provisional measures, expressly confirms an arbitral tribunal’s power to award interest, and does 
not generally limit the tribunal to awards for monetary damages and restitution of property.157  
 How are multiple claims addressed in the ECT? 
The ECT provides little in the way of guidance when it comes to multiple investor claims. It 
simply prescribes arbitration as a legitimate mechanism for the settlement of investor-state 
disputes, leaving the rest to the given forum chosen by the parties.158 As a result there are no 
procedural provisions requiring or encouraging consistency. In particular, there is no clause 
prescribing, encouraging or even allowing the consolidation of multiple investor claims. Any 
consolidation must be authorised by the rules of the respective arbitral forum or derived from 
general arbitral practice.159  
 
This is consistent with the generally accepted view that “a BIT is only a vehicle for some type 
of arbitration, whose legal nature is not in principle affected or determined by the BIT.”160 Yet, 
as will be outlined below, such deference to the very same rules as other arbitration proceedings 
risks an over-reliance on traditional procedure and creates the false impression that “investment 
arbitration [is not]…so far apart from international commercial arbitration.”161  
 Adjudicating multiple proceedings under ICSID 
As the largest arbitral institution in the world, and the most common forum employed in both 
the Spanish solar arbitrations and ECT arbitrations more generally, ICSID has a considerable 
influence on how multiple claims proceed under the ECT. 
 
The ICSID Convention is the central guiding document of ICSID. While it puts a premium on 
accuracy, it says little about multiple claims or the importance of consistency between similar 
decisions.162 There is no provision outlining whether cases arising out of the same factual 
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scenario or those involving similar legal issues can or should be consolidated.163 Prior to the 
latest review of the ICSID rules in 2006, a number of proposals were put forward for greater 
participation of third parties and streamlined provisional measures, yet no consolidation or 
joinder provisions gained any traction.164 If consolidation is to occur at all under ICSID, it must 
rest on Article 44 of the ICSID Convention, which authorises tribunals to fill procedural gaps 
not covered by the Convention or any of the ICSID arbitration rules.165 This lack of direct 
engagement with the issue of multiple investor claims can perhaps be explained by the fact that 
the ICSID Convention may be amended only if all Contracting States ratify the amendment, 
something which has never happened in the history of the Convention.166   
 
The ICSID Convention is supplemented by various regulations and rules. These include the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules, which outline procedures for the conduct of an arbitration proceeding 
from the constitution of the tribunal to the preparation of its award.167  Like the ICSID 
Convention, the rules are silent on multiple claims; however Rule 19 does authorise tribunals to 
“make orders required for the conduct of the proceeding.”168 While this rule does not leave any 
room for improvisation by an arbitral tribunal, it has been interpreted as permissive of voluntary 
consolidation in a number of ICSID cases.169  
 
In Suez v Argentina, the tribunal accepted, relying on Article 44 of the ICSID Convention, that 
it could hear the claims of five different investors jointly, provided that this was the wish of the 
parties.170 Likewise, in Abaclat v Argentina, the tribunal accepted that Article 44 of the 
Convention and Rule 19 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules permitted it to make unique procedural 
arrangements when confronted with a mass claim brought by a large number of investors.171 The 
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tribunal called this process, “filling the gaps left by the ICSID Convention and Arbitration 
Rules.”172  It is also worth noting that, independent of the Convention and the Arbitration Rules, 
the ICSID secretariat has developed a practice of recommending that the same arbitrators be 
appointed in cases raising similar issues. The Secretariat justifies this practice as an attempt to 
reach “in practice a result that is as close to consolidation as possible.”173 
 
Despite the lack of explicit provisions regarding multiple claims, a number of practical 
mechanisms do exist to permit voluntary, ad hoc consolidation under ICSID. Yet, while such 
practices go some way to reducing the risk of inconsistency, inconsistent decisions continue to 
occur and the majority of ICSID claims proceed individually (as evident by the Spanish solar 
arbitrations). There is no legal mechanism encouraging, incentivising or obliging similar 
investors to bring claims arising out of the same factual circumstances before one arbitral 
tribunal.  
 Adjudicating multiple proceedings under UNCTIRAL 
Unlike ICSID, UNCITRAL is not a formalised arbitral institution but rather a comprehensive set 
of rules to be followed in ad hoc arbitration.174 The UNCITRAL Arbitration rules set the 
parameters within which proceedings must operate. They were last revised in 2010 and now 
include a joinder provision in Article 17(4), which allows one or more third persons to be joined 
in the arbitration, provided this does not prejudice any other party and provided they are party to 
the same arbitration agreement.175 While this provision may offer assistance in respect of some 
investment treaty claims, much will depend on how the phrase “arbitration agreement” is 
interpreted. If it is interpreted narrowly, as the agreement between a specific investor and a host 
State to arbitrate, it will offer little help in the case of concurrent claims. However, if interpreted 
broadly as the investment treaty itself, then perhaps similar claimants invoking BIT provisions 
could make use of this provision to join their claims. In any case, aside from Article 17(4), there 
are no UNCITAL provisions promoting consistency between multiple claims, nor any general 
provisions on consolidation.  
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Interestingly, during working group discussions prior to the 2010 revision of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, some delegations expressed support for the inclusion of a consolidation 
provision similar to that contained in the rules of the International Criminal Court.176 They did 
so on the basis that consolidation was seen to be more efficient and more conducive of consistent 
awards. While their proposal gained traction and the UNCITRAL Secretariat prepared a draft 
provision, it was ultimately rejected. Concerns regarding the applicability of such a provision in 
non-administered arbitrations were cited as the prevailing reason for this outcome.177  In other 
words, the consolidation provision was considered unworkable due to the ad hoc nature of the 
rules. 
 
Turning to the Spanish Solar arbitrations, it is interesting to note that the only consolidated claim 
of the crisis, PV Investors v Spain, was brought under the UNCITRAL Rules.178 Clearly, despite 
no explicit provisions in respect of consolidation, UNCITRAL tribunals are prepared to accept 
the voluntary consolidation of claims when all parties to the dispute agree.  
 Adjudicating multiple proceedings in SSC arbitrations 
Of the arbitral fora prescribed in the ECT, the SSC Arbitration Rules are the most explicit in 
their recognition of consolidation. Since 2007, these rules have provided, in Article 11 that:179 
Upon the submission of a Request for Arbitration concerning a legal relationship in respect 
of which an arbitration between the same parties is already pending under these Rules, the 
Board may, at the request of a party, decide to include the claims contained in the Request 
for Arbitration in the pending proceedings. Such decision will only be made after consulting 
the parties and the Arbitral Tribunal.  
 
While this article is explicit, it is not particularly conducive to the consolidation of concurrent 
claims. Instead, it is targeted at parallel proceedings involving the same parties, ruling out 
consolidation where the parties’ claims are virtually identical but not the same. Of the three 
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Spanish solar claims proceeding in accordance with the SSC Arbitration rules, none have been 
consolidated. 
 Relevance to Spanish solar arbitration 
Given the wording of the various arbitration rules and procedures mentioned above, it is hardly 
surprising that the Spanish solar arbitrations have largely proceeded in a separate and isolated 
manner. Without any provision incentivising, encouraging or even outlining the option of 
consolidation, claimants will almost always opt to bring their own independent claim against a 
host state. Notwithstanding that a consolidated approach may bring a more efficient and 
consistent resolution, parties are unlikely to work together unless encouraged and unless specific 
procedures exist to ensure that investors do not open themselves up to revealing information to 
their competitors when bringing a consolidated claim.180  
C Implications of an Individualised Approach to Multiple ECT Claims 
 Benefits of an individualised approach 
The individualised approach to adjudicating claims of multiple investors under the ECT ensures 
that the confidential and autonomous features of arbitration, which often appeal to investors, are 
safeguarded.181 It ensures that every investor has the full opportunity to pursue their claim and 
that the risk of disclosing commercially sensitive information to competitors is negligible or nil. 
As stated by the tribunal in the NAFTA dispute of Corn Products International:182 
“…the parties should not have to calculate which items of information, evidence, documents 
and arguments they can share with their competitors and which ones they cannot share. The 
tribunal hearing the claims should not have to require separate procedures to accommodate 
the competitive sensitivity of the evidence and submissions of the different claimants. Under 
such circumstances, a consolidation order cannot be in the interests of fair and efficient 
resolution of the claims. Two tribunals can handle two separate cases more fairly and 
efficiently than one tribunal where the two claimants are direct and major competitors, and 
the claims raise issues of competitive and commercial sensitivity. 
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In support of such an approach is the reality that an unconsolidated approach to multiple claims 
works in most cases. The majority of arbitral decisions do tend to follow past decisions and in 
the uncommon instance when the sheer number of claimants makes separate arbitration 
impossible, perhaps the ability of tribunals to fill the gaps in Arbitral rules and allow a mass 
claim arbitration to proceed is sufficient.  After all, the Tribunal in Abaclat was prepared to 
accept that when “claimants have homogenous rights of compensation for a homogenous damage 
caused to them by potential homogenous breaches by [a host state] of homogenous obligations”, 
their claims may be brought by a single representative entity.183  
 Costs of an unconsolidated approach 
Yet, while the decision in Abaclat represents an innovative and encouraging example of mass 
claim arbitration under ICSID, it was only able to occur because of full claimant consent, because 
of the homogeneity of claims and because, at the outset, a single entity emerged that was able to 
represent the large number of claimants.184 Interestingly, Argentina objection to this 
“unprecedented mass action” was not considered a barrier to the tribunal’s jurisdiction. 185 In 
any case, the consolidation of claims under current rules and institutions is severely limited and 
remains in an infant stage.  
 
Moreover, although the majority of multiple proceedings do reach consistent decisions, those 
that do not are glaringly obvious, undermine the rule of law and threaten the legitimacy of 
investment arbitration. When, in 2001, tribunals delivered inconsistent awards in the cases of 
CME and Lauder it reflected poorly on investment arbitration as a method of fair and effective 
dispute resolution.186 These two awards arose out of a dispute relating to broadcasting licenses, 
which had been revoked by the Czech Media Council. The former was filed by Mr Lauder, a 
shareholder of CME, and the later by the parent company. Although these two cases arose out 
of the same circumstances and involved the same legal issues, the tribunals reached opposite 
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conclusions. The former tribunal awarded no compensation for lack of proof of causation, while 
the latter awarded compensation amount to approximately USD 270 million.187  
 
Another prominent example of inconsistency concerns two awards issued in the wake of the 
Argentine Financial Crisis. These cases were discussed with brevity in Part I, but it is worth 
reflecting once again on these decisions. The claims of investors in both LG&E and CMS were 
identical in all material respects and in both instances Argentina invoked the fundamental 
international law defence of necessity.188 These similarities notwithstanding, the Tribunal in 
CMS placed the burden of proving necessity on the host state and ultimately rejected the defence, 
whereas the Tribunal in LG&E took the opposite approach and found the defence to be made 
out.189  This inconsistency is all the more surprising given that Judge Francisco Rezek sat on 
both tribunals.  
 
Both of these examples demonstrate the difficulty of maintaining consistency between 
concurrent multiple claims. In both instances, separate tribunals faced with same issues failed to 
take a consistent approach to the law and produced conflicting decisions. Whether an 
inconsistent outcome is likely to occur in respect of the Spanish solar arbitrations is of critical 
relevance to the present discussion.  
 Implications in the Spanish solar arbitrations 
As the investors’ claims against Spain are all currently pending, is it impossible to determine the 
precise effect that an individualised approach will have on the outcome of this dispute.  
Nevertheless, it is logical to expect that without a consolidated decision on matters of legal 
principle, separate and confidential tribunals will inevitably take differing views on the 
application of the investor protections contained in the ECT.190  
 
These protections have never before been interpreted in the context of renewable energy 
investment and the only previous arbitration to address whether the revocation of economic-
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price supports amounted to expropriation, Nykomb v Latvia, was heavily criticised for 
disregarding internationally recognised expropriation reasoning methods (the sole-effects and 
mixed-effects doctrines).191 There is very little direction for tribunals on the approach to follow 
or on the appropriate standard that ought to be met.  
 
Tribunals have wide discretion and it is entirely possible that they will draw opposite conclusions 
in virtually identical situations. For example, one tribunal may find that Spain breached its duty 
to accord investors with “fair and equitable treatment” when it reneged on its promise to provide 
a stable, welcoming environment for solar PV investment. Such a conclusion is entirely plausible 
given that an increasing number of tribunals have recognised that “fair and equitable treatment” 
can include the “legitimate business expectations of investors”.192 Another tribunal may find that 
while Spain breached its obligations, its actions were defensible in light of an economic crisis so 
severe that austerity became an “essential security interest of the state”.193 While some tribunals 
have taken a narrow view of the “necessity defence” in the past, economic crises have been 
accepted as legitimate justification for a BIT breach.194  
 
What these examples demonstrate is that inconsistent awards are a very real possibility in the 
Spanish solar arbitrations. In fact, even if all twenty tribunals were to decide consistently in 
favour of the solar PV investors, it is still likely that they would adopt differing approaches on 
the issue of the appropriate remedy.195 In either case, inconsistency has (at the very least) the 
potential to anger disputing parties and confuse the public.  
 
Legal uncertainty such as outlined above, is also of particular concern to current and future 
renewable energy investors in ECT Member states, as well as to the governments of such states 
(particularly those already employing FiT policies). Governments must be able to know the 
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extent to which they can regulate to encourage the production of renewable energy (as required 
under EU law) without that regulation amounting to an enforceable promise.196 Investors too 
must be able to know when weight should be placed on promises of government support and to 
what extent. Without such predictability, investment disputes over feed-in tariffs will continue, 
creating market uncertainty and reducing both the likelihood of future investment in solar PV 
and the likelihood of future governmental support.  
 
Although such public policy considerations do weigh in to the interpretations by arbitral tribunals 
of the appropriate balance between legitimate regulation in the public interest and unfair and 
inequitable treatment or expropriation, they are often under-weighted. For the most part, this is 
due to the lack of guidance in respect of what kinds of state conduct are considered acceptable 
and when. While the ECT is relatively specific in terms of the protections it provides to investors, 
it is silent on when a breach of such protections may be justified. Tribunals must turn to 
customary international law principles, such as “necessity” and “state responsibility” in order to 
determine the scope of legitimate public action. 197  These principles are easily discounted 
relative to the explicit treaty rights of investors under the ECT. In the not dissimilar argentine 
fiscal crisis cases, the tribunals struggled to determine the scope of Argentine’s defence of 
necessity and drew wildly different conclusions on the extent to which the “public interest” 
element of Argentina’s actions could be considered.198 It is likely that the same struggle will 
occur in the Spanish solar crisis and that public interest considerations will be discounted relative 
to the enshrined treaty rights of solar PV investors.  
 
IV Reforming Arbitration to Better Respond to Multiple Claims 
 
The final section of this paper will engage in a normative analysis of how investment arbitration 
procedures might be amended to better handle multiple claims arising out of the same or similar 
factual circumstances. As in any normative exercise, the plausible policy options are extensive 
and cannot all be adequately examined. As a result, three have been chosen, which are the most 
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relevant to the Spanish Solar crisis and also the most easily implemented – greater consolidation 
of claims, the use of test cases and preliminary rulings. 
A Greater Consolidation 
Greater consolidation of related claims may offer an effective way to ensure that multiple 
investor disputes are resolved more effectively and consistently. But is consolidation beneficial, 
possible and practicable in cases like as the Spanish solar crisis?  
 The advantages and disadvantages of consolidation 
Greater consolidation of concurrent arbitral proceedings is often considered to be the most 
attractive option when dealing with the issue of inconsistency.199 It can be understood as the 
joining of two or more separate proceedings into one arbitration conducted by consolidated 
tribunal.200 Consolidation is not a new idea - it already occurs on an ad-hoc basis in investment 
arbitration, is well-known in domestic arbitration and, when compared with other reform 
proposals, is less dramatic or expensive.201 It can save time, reduce costs and has the added 
benefit of requiring states to defend themselves in only one proceeding.202  
 
These advantages notwithstanding, requiring foreign investors to collaborate entails a marked 
departure from the fundamental principle of party autonomy and may cause a considerable 
number of practical difficulties (not least surrounding commercially sensitive information).203  If 
greater consolidation of investor claims is to occur, a balance must be struck between the right 
of a foreign investor to have its individual claim heard and the desire for a more consistent, more 
efficient arbitral process.204 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) strikes a 
modest balance between these competing interests and is a useful model for ECT reform.205 
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 Consolidation under NAFTA 
Article 1126 of NAFTA permits arbitral tribunals to “assume jurisdiction over, and hear and 
determine together” the claims of multiple foreign investors.206 It permits consolidation where 
two or more claims submitted to arbitration “have a question of law or fact in common”, where 
consolidation is “in the interests of fair and efficient resolution of claims”, and where 
consolidation is requested by one or both of the disputing parties.207  
 
These requirements have put tight limits on the scope of consolidation under NAFTA, yet article 
1126 remains the most prominent consolidation provision in investor-state arbitration and also 
the most relevant in practice.208 It has been invoked on a number of occasions, but not without 
difficulty. In particular, tribunals have reached differing conclusions on what is in the interests 
of fair and efficient resolution of claims.209 
 
In Corn Products v Mexico (Corn Products), the tribunal held that the consolidation of two soft 
drink manufacturers’ claims against Mexico was not consistent with this requirement.210 It 
concluded that the “direct and major competition between the claimants” would inhibit their 
ability to work together and share information. They further concluded that complex and slow 
proceedings were likely to result due to the parties’ desire to protect the confidentiality of 
sensitive information.211  
 
By contrast, in Canfor, Tembec and Terminal Forest v United States (Softwood Lumber), the 
tribunal held that the consolidation of the claims of four lumber companies was “in the interests 
of the fair and efficient resolution of claims.”212 This was in spite of the fact that the investors 
wanted their claims to remain separate and were reluctant to co-operate.213 The tribunal also held 
that the consent of investors to consolidation could be derived from their general consent to 
  
206  NAFTA, above n 205, art 1126. 
207  Art 1126. 
208  Knahr, above n 202, at 8. 
209  At 8. 
210  Corn Products¸ above n 180, at [9]. 
211  At [8]. 
212  Canfor Corp v United States, Tembec et al v United States, and Terminal Forest Products Ltd  
v United States UNCITRAL (Order of the Consolidation Tribunal), 7 September 2005 at [221]. 
213  Knahr, above n 202, at 9. 
THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE SPANISH SOLAR CRISIS: 
A RECIPE FOR DISASTER? 
 
43 
 
arbitrate under Section B of NAFTA Chapter 11.214 Interestingly, the tribunal interpreted Chapter 
11 as a package deal, which included the possibility that consolidation might be ordered if the 
provisions of Article 1126 were met.215 This implied consent on the part of an investor can be 
likened to a state’s standing offer to arbitrate, which is derived from a general arbitration 
provision in a BIT.216  
 Applicability of Article 1126 to ECT disputes 
While the application of article 1126 has been inconsistent, it appears to strike a good balance 
between party autonomy and the need for compulsory consolidation in some circumstances. By 
requiring “fairness and efficiency”, it puts a necessary boundary on tribunal discretion. By 
authorising tribunals to act only when consolidation is “desired by one or both of the parties,” it 
ensures that party autonomy remains central to the enquiry.217 Yet, would such a provision 
function effectively if incorporated into the ECT and would it have encouraged consolidation in 
the case of the Spanish solar arbitrations?  
 
In answering these questions, it is first helpful to point out a number of similarities between the 
ECT and NAFTA. Both are multilateral agreements, both regulate trade and investment, and 
both contain similar investor protections that are enforceable through arbitration.218 A number 
of points of difference are also of interest. Where NAFTA has tri-partisan membership, the ECT 
has 51 member states. Where NAFTA applies to all inter-state investments, the ECT is focused 
solely on investments in the energy sector. Both the wide membership and the narrow focus of 
the ECT make it a fertile breeding ground for concurrent claims against a host State.219 It would 
appear to be a prime candidate for consolidated proceedings. 
 Incorporating a consolidation provision in practice 
The desirability of consolidation notwithstanding, the ECT contains no reference to 
consolidation and the likelihood of incorporating such a reference today is very slim. Unlike 
NAFTA, which has been continuously revised over the past two decades (particularly in respect 
  
214  Canfor Corp, above n 212, at [79]. 
215  Knahr, above n 202, at 9. 
216  Dugan, above n 6, at 221-222. 
217  Dimsey, above n 200, at 135. 
218  NAFTA, above n 205, chapter 11; ECT, above n 1, art 26. 
219  Happold and Roe, above n 149, at 75 and 96. 
THOMAS STUART 
44 
 
of the rules of origin), the ECT has remained almost entirely intact since coming into effect in 
1998.220 This rigidity can largely be attributed to the requirement of unanimity between 
contracting parties before any amendment is made. This standard is guaranteed by Article 36(1) 
of the ECT and has resulted in a static agreement that “marks the high watermark of investor 
protection.”221 Today it is virtually impossible to envisage that consensus could ever be reached 
in respect of an amendment that grafts a consolidation provision onto the ECT.222 The same can 
be said for the ICSID Convention, which governs the procedural elements of many ECT disputes 
and provides for the enforceability of most arbitral awards.223 Like the ECT, the ICSID 
Convention requires consensus for amendment and experience has shown this to be “unlikely to 
the point of impossibility”.224  
 
In light of the rigidity of both the ECT and the ICSID Convention, inclusion of a consolidation 
provision into the subsidiary ICSID Arbitration Rules and UNCITRAL Arbitration may provide 
the next best alternative.225 Amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules in 2006 brought about 
significant changes to arbitral practice under ICSID, including a number of new transparency 
provisions.226 Amendments to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in 2010 also succeeded in 
introducing a number of new provisions, particularly in respect of multi-party arbitration, 
procedural efficiency and interim measures.227 While neither of these arbitration rules precludes 
consolidation, an explicit provision would help to legitimise and encourage the practice in 
appropriate circumstances.228 In the past, proposals to introduce consolidation have failed to gain 
the necessary support from the respective governing bodies. Yet, as the need to streamline 
concurrent claims becomes more and more apparent, such proposals are likely to gain the 
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necessary traction. Provided the written vote of the administrative councils can be obtained, new 
amendments providing for consolidation could be immediately effective.229  
 Greater consolidation in the Spanish solar arbitrations 
The Spanish solar arbitrations are a prime candidate for consolidated proceedings. Nevertheless, 
it remains to be seen whether article 1126 (or an equivalent) would have enabled effective 
consolidation on the facts. To answer this question, it must be determined whether the parties 
would have invoked the provision, whether there is a question of fact or law in common, and 
whether consolidation is in the interest of the “fair and efficient resolution of claims.”230 
 
The first two criteria are likely to be easily satisfied, at least to some extent. Even on the off 
chance that Spain does not invoke the provision to avoid defending 20 fragmented claims, many 
of the claimants would likely have invoked the provision in the interests of efficiency, cost-
cutting and clarity.231 Unlike the soft drink industry discussed in Corn products, the solar PV 
sector is not fiercely competitive internally (its main competition is with fossil fuel energy 
producers), and agreeable collaboration between investors is foreseeable. 232 This 
notwithstanding, it is still doubtful whether all investors would have agreed to collaborate. As it 
stands, the claimant investors have brought claims before three separate arbitral institutions, 
making it highly unforeseeable that they would have all agreed to collaborate and bring a claim 
simply before ICSID or an alternative institution. Nevertheless, even if only those investors 
which brought their claims before ICSID (over two-thirds of claimants) had agreed to 
collaborate, this would still have had considerable positive net effects in terms of consistency 
and cost-cutting.  
 
Of further interest, all foreign investors that have claimed against Spain do so in respect of the 
same amendments to the feed-in tariff policy, invoke the same provisions of the ECT (either 
Articles 10, 12, 13 or a combination of the three), and bring claims in respect of very similar 
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investments (namely capital investments in large solar parks between 10-100MW in capacity).233 
As in Softwood Lumber, which was consolidated under NAFTA, there are questions of law and 
fact in common.234  
 
Yet, just as in both Softwood Lumber and Corn Products, satisfying the final criterion of 
“fairness and efficiency” is inherently difficult. On the one hand, allowing the claims to proceed 
individually guarantees that every investor’s claim is heard and that all commercially sensitive 
information remains confidential.235 Yet on the other, consolidation ensures that like solar PV 
investors are treated alike and that Spain is bound to a consistent position in respect of energy 
regulation.236 Consolidation may also make for a more efficient process. Spain would only have 
to defend its actions before one consolidated tribunal and investors could make use of joint 
representation to cut legal costs and save time.237  
 
Overall, if Article 1126 or an equivalent were applicable, it would improve the likelihood of 
consolidation in the case of the Spanish solar arbitrations and would consequently reduce the 
likelihood of inconsistency between awards.  
B The Temporary Suspension of Proceedings, Preliminary Rulings and Test Cases 
 
An alternative means of promoting consistency could involve the use of test cases or preliminary 
rulings. Such mechanisms would provide guidance to tribunals while preserving their 
independence. While a temporary suspension of proceedings would be required for such 
mechanisms to function effectively, this may in fact assist in ensuring the prompt and final 
resolutions of disputes. The following section will examine whether the suspension of 
proceedings is practical and appropriate in investment treaty arbitration. 
  The advantages and disadvantages of staying proceedings 
The suspension of proceedings is not completely unknown to investment arbitration. In fact, “the 
power of a tribunal to stay proceedings to await the outcome of a related dispute in another 
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forum” is well established.238 In SGS v Phillipines, an ICSID tribunal decided to stay proceedings 
pending the outcome of litigation before the domestic courts of the home state.239 The investor’s 
claim was dependent upon the finding of a breach of contract by the domestic court and it was 
thus in the interests of efficiency and consistency to stay proceedings.240   
 
Outside of the investment context, the tribunal in the MOX Plant arbitration decided that the risk 
of European competence over a dispute between the United Kingdom and Ireland (over the 
construction of a plutonium plant on the Irish Sea) justified a stay of proceedings pending a 
hearing by the European Court of Justice.241 Likewise, international tribunals have on numerous 
occasions recognised that they have discretion to stay their proceedings if there is another 
tribunal seized of the matter.242  Ordinarily, they will do so when it is both in the interests of the 
parties and the ends of justice to defer to said tribunal.243 By way of an example, the tribunal in 
SPP v Egypt decided to stay the exercise of its jurisdiction pending a decision by a parallel ICC 
arbitration.244 While international tribunals have confined the scope of this discretion to 
concurrent arbitrations brought by identical claimants under the same treaty, there is potential 
for a broader approach in the case of investment arbitration.245 
 
At present, this potential has not been realised.246  In the controversial CME & Lauder cases, the 
tribunals took a strict view of the requirement of identical claimants and specifically rejected an 
argument by the Czech Republic that one of the cases be deferred on the basis that the economic 
identity of the claimant parties was the same.247 As a result, two conflicting awards were 
delivered, which have since becoming infamous as examples of the danger of concurrent 
proceedings. Adopting a broader definition of the identity of parties may offer considerable 
  
238  Wehland, above n 161, at 7.03. 
239  SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v Republic of the Philippines (Objections to Jurisdiction), ICSID  
ARB/02/6, 29 January 2004 at [173] and [176]. 
240  At [175]. 
241  Mox Plant Arbitration (Ireland v United Kingdom) (Award) (2003) 126 ILR 310at [20]-[28]; Campbell  
McLachlan Lis Pendens in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston, 2009) at 337. 
242  McLachlan, above n 241, at 287. 
243  McLachlan, above n 241, at 287. 
244  Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd v Arab Republic of Egypt (Decision on Objections to  
Jurisdiction)  ICSID ARB/84/03, 27 November 1985. 
245  McLachlan, above n 241, at 291 and 297. 
246  Wehland, above n 161, at 7.23. 
247  CME Czech Republic BV, above n 186, at 355. 
THOMAS STUART 
48 
 
advantages for tribunals tasked with resolving multiple-investor disputes.248 In particular, it may 
provide tribunals with helpful guidance on the applicable law and also ensure that investor 
protections are interpreted consistently between tribunals.249 Unlike consolidation, it would 
achieve these ends without interfering with the right of an investor to be heard independently.250 
It is submitted that wherever claimants are in privity of interest with each other or base their 
claims on the same investor protections in the same factual scenario, there is sufficient identity 
of parties to justify a stay of proceedings.251  
 
While there is no doctrine of stare decisis or binding precedent at international law, there are 
many reasons why proceedings that have been stayed pending the outcome of a test case or 
preliminary ruling would follow the approach of a prior tribunal.252 Thanks to the system of 
jurisprudence constante, which has evolved in investment arbitration, tribunals are now 
generally expected to give due consideration to relevant decisions and justify any divergence in 
their approach. 253 This expectation is likely to be all the more apparent where a test case or 
preliminary ruling has been given.254  
 
Yet, the temporary suspension of proceedings has disadvantages too. Not only does it increase 
the time it takes for a tribunal to issue an award, it also puts considerable pressure on the tribunal 
tasked with resolving the test case or preliminary ruling to approach the legal standards correctly. 
If the tribunal makes a poor decision, it is likely that the consequences will be compounded when 
the suspended proceedings are resumed.255 The way in which a test case or preliminary ruling 
procedure is implemented is central to its success or failure. 
 Staying proceedings pending resolution of a test case 
The most straightforward method of suspending proceedings pending a test case involves greater 
use of the international law principle of comity, which calls on international forums “to defer, 
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when appropriate, to other courts and to treat their procedures and decisions with courtesy and 
respect.”256 Consistent with this principle, arbitral tribunals already have the power to stay 
proceedings awaiting the outcome of a related dispute in another forum, usually for purposes of 
justice and efficiency.257  
 
Extending this principle to allow tribunals to halt proceedings in anticipation of a related arbitral 
award (involving different claimants but near-identical factual and legal issues) would require 
few structural changes.258  Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Article 19 of the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules, and Article 44 of the ICSID Convention already provide the impetus 
for tribunals to “make orders required for the conduct of the proceeding” and to “fill the gaps” 
in arbitral rules and agreements.259 A further provision is required, but it need not be problematic. 
Inclusion of a simple provision in the arbitral rules, which provides for the elevation of a 
particular factual circumstance to the position of a test case (with the consent of the parties) and 
which gives tribunals the discretion to order the temporary suspension of related proceedings, 
would be sufficient.    
 Staying proceedings pending a preliminary ruling 
A more radical option would be to adopt a model based on the European Union’s preliminary 
reference system.260 Under Article 234 of the Treaty on the Function of the European Union, a 
national court may ask the European Court of Justice (CJEU) for a preliminary ruling on a matter 
of European Union law.261 The outcome of this ruling is then binding on their final decision.  
This instrument has been effective in securing coherence and uniformity of European Union law. 
It has also been recognised as a potential template for other areas of international law.262  
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Adapted to investment arbitration, a preliminary rulings procedure could provide helpful 
guidance to tribunals faced with novel issues of treaty application or confronted with conflicting 
previous decisions.263 While a mechanism of this kind would require the establishment of a 
central and permanent body, no further changes to the basic functioning of investment treaty 
arbitration would be required.264 Unlike an appeals system, preliminary rulings would not 
obstruct the finality of awards. This means that Article 53 of the ICSID Convention could remain 
intact.265 As a matter of procedure, the body tasked with giving rulings would intervene prior to 
the resolution of a dispute, providing guidance on matters of law, but leaving the final resolution 
to the tribunal appointed by the parties.266 Of course, the central question when considering the 
plausibility of preliminary rulings is who will entrusted with deliver them? In the horizontal 
system of investment treaty arbitration, identifying an appropriate body or organ is inherently 
difficult; however it is possible that recourse could be had to the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
or that a new body which is fit-for-purpose could be established and provided with authority 
under the various Arbitration Rules.  
 
While it is inevitable that tribunals would need to suspend their proceedings pending a 
preliminary ruling (thereby increasing the time and costs of the process), this may help rather 
than hinder the prompt resolution of multiple investor disputes267 When claims proceed 
concurrently, all foreign investors must bring evidence in support of all elements of their claims. 
A preliminary ruling would resolve many of the broader issues of interpretation and procedure 
prior to a tribunal hearing, thereby enabling tribunals to focus on the specific facts of the dispute.  
The guidance received through the preliminary ruling would also provide reassurance that a 
uniform interpretation of the relevant investor protections was being applied.268 Although the 
details of a preliminary rulings mechanism require further discussion, the concept certainly 
offers considerable potential as a means for avoiding fragmentation in multiple investor disputes.  
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 A stay of proceedings in the Spanish solar crisis 
Regardless of which mechanism is adopted, implementing a suspension of proceedings in the 
Spanish solar arbitrations has the potential to add clarity and consistency to the dispute settlement 
process. While it may increase the time between the submission of claims and the rendering of 
final awards, it is likely to ensure that the Spanish Government and foreign solar investors alike 
are sent a consistent message. A consistent message would ensure that investors in Spanish 
renewable energy have some degree of market certainty and would provide the Spanish 
Government (and the governments of other ECT states) with clarity on when a withdrawal of 
support for solar investors will trigger the protections contained in the ECT.269  
 
If the test case procedure is adopted, it is likely that a clearer position in respect of Spain’s 
liability to investors will become evident sooner than under the current model. Likewise, if the 
more dramatic preliminary rulings procedure is implemented, and all claims currently lodged 
against Spain are temporarily suspended, the outcome of the preliminary ruling is likely to 
resolve a number of novel questions currently plaguing the Spanish solar arbitrations.270 In either 
case, investment tribunals will have a persuasive guideline to follow when determining the 
validity of solar investors’ claims. As a result, they will be far less likely to produce awards that 
are inconsistent with those rendered in separate, related proceedings.271  
C Other Options for Reform 
There are many different ways in which investment arbitration could evolve to better 
accommodate the claims of multiple investors against a host State. While consolidation and test 
cases offer possible application to the Spanish solar crisis and present interesting and viable 
options for energy disputes, it is not the author’s intention to advocate for either reform. Rather, 
the author wishes to highlight the need for arbitral discourse to think creatively and quickly about 
the ways in which Investment Treaty Arbitration can evolve to better resolve sector-wide 
disputes between investors and states. 
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V Conclusion 
 
Behind all of the complexities of the Spanish solar arbitrations, and putting aside the economic, 
political and social dimensions of the solar crisis, it is clear that investment arbitration is failing 
to efficiently resolve this investor-state dispute. While the tribunals tasked with adjudicating the 
matter have yet to deliver a single award, it is possible to predict with some certainty that when 
they do they will not render their awards consistently. Over twenty tribunals have been vested 
with jurisdiction and not one of those tribunals is composed of the same set of arbitrators.272 In 
addition, as dictated by the relevant arbitration rules, not one of those tribunals is required to 
consider the decisions of any others, nor required to decide consistently with previous relevant 
decisions.273 Instead, each tribunal is free to deliver its own decision based almost entirely on 
the primary applicable law - in this case, the Energy Charter Treaty. This degree of flexibility 
has profound implications for the parties as it fragments the regulatory dispute and greatly 
reduces the likelihood that like claims will be treated alike. 
 
There are many historical reasons why the system of investment arbitration has evolved in this 
way, without due consideration for consistency or the rule of law, and there are also many 
reasons why this omission has been difficult to correct in the investment treaty context.274 
Multilateral Conventions (such as ICSID and the ECT) are notoriously difficult to amend and 
any amendments that have been made to arbitration rules to date (such as the ICSID 
Amendments of 2006) have been limited to incremental process improvements, while ignoring 
the possibility of more systemic changes. 
 
The difficulties of amendment notwithstanding, crises such as the Argentine fiscal crisis of 2001 
and the Spanish solar crisis discussed in this paper highlight why significant reform is required. 
The way in which investment arbitration currently tackles sector-wide treaty disputes is 
inadequate and results in ongoing tensions and unclear outcomes. Because of the history of 
international arbitration as a bilateral method of dispute resolution, foreign investors from states 
that are party to an investment treaty (such as the Energy Charter Treaty) may bring 
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individualised claims against a signatory state whenever their regulatory actions cause financial 
loss. While this is appropriate when state actions affect only one foreign investor, such 
individualisation leads to unnecessary fragmentation when regulatory changes affect investors 
more generally. It may be in the best interests of each investor to have their claim heard 
separately, as it allows them to protect confidential information from competitors, and may even 
be in the interests of a defendant State, as it allows them re-work their case and build a stronger 
defence in later proceedings. However, individualisation is not in the interests of the effective 
resolution of a multi-party dispute nor the development of a consistent arbitral jurisprudence. 
Whenever disputes with significant factual and legal similarities are adjudicated concurrently, 
there is an unnecessary risk of inconsistency as well as an unwarranted duplication of argument. 
This not only increases costs for the parties but can also lead to conflicting decisions. 
 
While acknowledging that claims may sometimes need to retain a degree of individuality, it is 
imperative that new and innovative ways to resolve multiple investor disputes are developed.  
Consistent and reliable outcomes are of fundamental importance in such a context and a more 
refined, collaborative approach would not only ensure that a clear and consistent body of arbitral 
jurisprudence was developing, but would also better enable states to plan their regulatory actions 
and accurately predict the consequences of those actions. For investors too, more collaborative 
arbitration would ensure greater regularity and provide assurance of equitable treatment, which 
would subsequently work to minimise re-litigation and annulment proceedings.  
 
The solutions proposed in this paper are not dramatic or system wide. Instead, they are targeted 
towards the Energy Charter Treaty and towards disputes involving difficult public interest issues 
and a large number of investors. Disputes of this nature have rarely been heard by international 
tribunals, but investors are slowly realising the potential for recourse in such circumstances. 
They are invoking BITs in new ways but the system is not yet responding with a tailored 
approach. It is imperative that new rules of the road are developed, rules which promote or even 
require consolidation or which permit tribunals to stay proceedings pending the conclusion of a 
test case or a preliminary ruling. If implemented carefully and contextually, such reforms could 
prove highly effective in enabling disputes such as the Spanish solar crisis to be resolved more 
quickly and consistently. 
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Of course, these solutions are but some of the possibilities. The scope for arbitral reform in this 
area is considerable, yet it is not the central focus of this paper. Rather, it simply attempts to 
shine a light on the antiquated way in which disputes of this nature are being handled at present. 
Disputes over regulatory reforms, which affect multiple investors and the public interest, need 
modern and effective methods of resolution. Accepting this and the concessions it involves for 
the traditional practice of arbitration is the first step towards a better system of ISDS.  
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